The United States of Diversity. On Trade. By Scott Lincicome. Last year, economic, legal, and geopolitical calamity lurked in the shadows of almost every trade policy promise made by presidential candidate Donald Trump. Eight months into the Trump presidency, those problems havethankfullynot yet materialized. Instead, Trump trade policy has been a mixture of bluster, disappointment, relief, and uncertainty. This last category warrants close attention In the coming months, Trumps dangerous trade ambitions could remain in check, thus keeping a global trade system alive. Or politics, legal ambiguity, and Trumps own emotional impulses could deal that system a fatal blow. There is no doubt that President Trump has already done serious damage to the United States longstanding position as a world leader on trade policy, the American political consensus in favor of trade liberalization, and Republican views of trade and globalization. His constant vituperation has offended U. S. allies and trading partners, causing them to turn to Europe, Asia, or Latin America in search of alternatives to the once welcoming and predictable U. S. market. He has accelerated not started the American retreat from the World Trade Organization, further wounding a multilateral trading system that was a U. S. inventionan invention that has, contrary to popular belief, served U. S. economic and foreign policy interests well since the 1. Trumps day one withdrawal from the Trans Pacific Partnershipthe flawed yet deserving Asia Pacific trade agreement started by President Bush and ultimately signed by President Obamahas left vacuums in both Asia Pacific trade and international economic law. TPP was far from perfect, but it was widely supported by U. S. trade and foreign policy experts because of its economic and geopolitical benefits. The deal contained important new rules for 2. GMOs, and state owned enterprises. Moreover, it would have provided small but significant benefits for U. S. workers and the economy, while cementing the United Statess influence in a region increasingly covered by Chinas shadow. Now, TPP parties are working to complete a TPP 1. United States, while China is negotiating its own version of the TPPthe Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. And many of TPPs novel provisions are being relitigated in contentious NAFTA renegotiations with Canada and Mexico both TPP parties. All of this is disappointing, but its probably survivable and hardly the fire and brimstone of the Trump campaign trail hence, the relief. Trump has repeatedly threatened tariffs and other forms of dangerous unilateral protectionism, but economic, legal, and political realities have intervened. For example, when Trump promised new national security tariffs on steel and aluminum under Section 2. Trade Expansion Act of 1. Congress, business groups, strategic allies, NGOs, and even members of Trumps administration was unrelenting. As a result, planned tariffs have quietly been shelved for now. He had been driving, he often recalled, since he was twelve, as a young boy on a farm in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, his family, unusually, Jews among the. Other presidential threats have similarly come and gone without major action, giving market participants some heartburn but little long term pain. Only in the opaque area of trade remediesantidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard measureshas there been a marked uptick in U. S. protectionism. But this is the result of long and technical administrative proceedings initiated by U. S. industries or unions that formally petitioned the government under relevant domestic lawhardly the wave of the hand actions that Trump promised. Some measure of relief is warranted, but were not out of the woods just yet. Indeed, in the last eight months, Trump has publicly threatened toblock steel and aluminum imports for national security reasons or bring new cases against semiconductors and ships, under the aforementioned Section 2. North American Free Trade Agreement and the U. S. Korea FTA slap tariffs on Chinese imports under Section 3. Trade Act of 1. 97. Chinese intellectual property rights violations andimpose onerous new Buy American requirements on U. S. pipelines and government funded infrastructure projects. Family engagement is not optional. It is not an idea that can sit on a shelf until we determine we have the time or interest. Dr. Steve Constantino. First they came for the socialists, and I didnt speak out because I wasnt a socialist. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didnt speak out. To the surprise of liberals, a few good women have protested. Former Army Spec. Catherine Aspy, for instance. Her account, published in Readers Digest, February. And those are just the public threats. Behind closed doors, Trump has reportedly considered enacting sweeping import restrictions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The president reportedly yelled, I want tariffs. Bring me some tariffs when told by his globalist advisers that legal and economic realities prevent him from imposing broad based protectionism on a whim. None of the threats on Trumps wish list is officially off the table, and any one of them would have serious economic consequences Steel tariffs alone would put more than 1. American jobs at risk NAFTA withdrawal could destroy 2. American goods, services, or investment in response to Trumpian protectionism. Trumps actions would also raise major legal issues. For example, the World Trade Organizations broad, subjective national security exception wasnt intended to be used as a get out of jail free card for steel tariffs, and a dispute over a members right to invoke it could imperil the multilateral trading system. Meanwhile, Trumps withdrawal from a free trade agreement without congressional consent would raise major constitutional questions as to whether the president had that authority and what would happen to the myriad U. S. tariffs and other commitments that were embedded in legislation and passed into law. Lawsuits over these and other issues surrounding presidential trade powers would throw billions of dollars of cross border trade and investments into legal limbo. The presidents unpredictability, political weakness, and clear affinity for protectionism, combined with ample though ambiguous legal authority to act unilaterally, mean that any one of his trade threats could still materialize in the coming months. The White Houses internationalists may have won the early battles, but the war will rage for as long as Trump is president. Continued vigilance and advocacy for the benefits of freer trade remain critical. And congressional legislation clarifying and limiting the presidents trade powers might not be a bad idea eitherjust in case. Click here to read what Scott Lincicome wrote about Candidate Trump and trade last year. Scott Lincicome is an international trade attorney, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, and visiting lecturer at Duke University Law School. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of his employer. On Taxes. By James Pethokoukis. At some point in his first term, President Donald Trump will likely sign legislation that cuts taxes by some amount for somebody. This modest prediction is based less on reading the political tea leaves than understanding conservative politics. If any issue made the modern Republican Party, it was tax cuts. Not surprising, then, that candidate Trump promised big cuts for individuals and businesses. And with the GOP now holding the White House and Congress, failure to deliver is almost unimaginable. Of course its almost equally unimaginable that the Trump tax cuts will at all resemble the ambitious plans devised by Trump advisers during the campaign. There were two of those blueprints. The first, rolled out September 2. Along with other changes, including eliminating the alternative minimum tax and estate tax, this initial plan might have lowered annual government revenue by a whopping 1 trillion a year or more even if one assumes much faster economic growth. This was, in other words, more a fantasy proposal cooked up by Reagan era supply siders than a serious effort to reform the tax code without worsening our historically high federal debt. Indeed, Trumps sole purpose in signing on to the plan may have been to win over that very same group, still influential among base voters. Trump himself talked little about the plan while on the hustings, especially compared with immigration, trade, and The Wall. The Trump campaigns second bite at the apple a year later was a scaled back plan, but still a colossal one. Instead of losing a trillion bucks a year, maybe the government would be out just a half trillion or so. Again, since the plan was unaccompanied by spending cuts elsewhere in the budget, it was more a set of glorified campaign talking points than a serious proposal. And like the first, Trump didnt talk much about it. So after Trumps shock election, there really was no realistic Trump tax plan. Turnitin Technology to Improve Student Writing. Easily provide feedback, assess work, and check for plagiarism.
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